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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTH AMENDMENT AND SEARCH AND
SEIZURE-INTRODUCING THE SUPREME COURT'S NEW AND IMPROVED
SUMMERS DETENTION: Now EQUIPPED WITH HANDCUFFING AND
QUESTIONING! Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment, in part, states, "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons . . .against unreasonable . . .seizures, shall not be
violated."' There are two main categories of police conduct that constitute a
seizure of a person: physical seizure and submission-to-authority seizure.2 A
physical seizure of a person occurs when a law enforcement official con-
fronts an individual and restrains that person's ability to walk away.3 The
quintessential physical seizure of a person occurs when a police officer ar-
rests an individual.4 In addition, a more limited physical seizure of a person
arises when an officer performs a stop-and-frisk on an individual5 or detains
an occupant of a house that is validly being searched by the police.6 The
second category, submission-to-authority, occurs when a law enforcement
official has some sort of contact with an individual, and a reasonable person
in the same situation would not feel free to leave7 or would not feel free to
refuse the officer's request and end the encounter.8
This note explores the United States Supreme Court's recent decision
in Muehler v. Mena9 that extended the holding in Michigan v. Summers'0 to
allow police officers to handcuff and question occupants of a house who are
lawfully being detained during the execution of a valid search warrant."
First, the note examines the facts behind the Mena case itself.'2 Second, the
note explores the historical developments in Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence that led up to the Mena decision. 3 This section of the note focuses on
1. UNITED STATES CONST. amend. IV.
2. PHILLIP A. HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW: A FOURTH
AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 120 (2005); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 n.16 (1968).
3. HUBBART, supra note 2, at 120-21 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 16).
4. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991).
5. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16; see infra Part III.B.
6. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981); see infra Part III.B.
7. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984); see infra Part III.D.
8. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991); see infra Part III.D.
9. 544 U.S. 93 (2005).
10. 452 U.S. 692; see infra Part III.B.
11. See infra Part IV.A.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
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five main topics: (1) the creation of the Fourth Amendment;14 (2) the evolu-
tion of the standard that governs a limited seizure of a person;15 (3) the juri-
sprudence of excessive force claims against law enforcement officials; 6 (4)
the amount of police questioning that constitutes a limited seizure of a per-
son;17 and (5) the amount of time that a limited seizure of a person may
last.1 8 With the historical context stated, the note then explores the reasoning
that the majority used in Mena to rationalize its holding," as well as the
reasoning that the concurring opinions presented.2' Finally, this note consid-
ers the significance of this case,21 suggesting that the bright-line rule created
in Mena may have both positive and negative consequences, 22 that the ma-
jority's analysis was incomplete, 3 and that the case left many questions un-
answered.24
II. FACTS
Officers Muehler and Brill, petitioners, obtained information from an
investigation of a gang-related, drive-by shooting that led them to suspect
that at least one member of the West Side Locos gang, Raymond Romero,25
lived at 1363 Patricia Avenue.26 Since the petitioners suspected him in the
shooting, they also had reason to believe that Mr. Romero was armed and
dangerous. 2' Based on these circumstances, Officer Muehler obtained a
search warrant for the house and premises where the officers believed Mr.
Romero lived.28 The search warrant allowed the police to conduct a broad
search of the house and premises for deadly weapons and evidence of gang
membership. 29 Because the petitioners believed that the execution of the
search warrant might involve confrontation with multiple, armed gang
14. See infra Part III.A.
15. See infra Part III.B.
16. See infra Part III.C.
17. See infra Part III.D.
18. See infra Part III.E.
19. See infra Part IV.A.
20. See infra Parts IV.B-C.
21. See infra Part V.
22. See infra Part V.A.
23. See infra Part V.B.
24. See infra Part V.C.
25. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 106 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 95 (majority opinion). The Mena family, who owned the residence at 1363
Patricia Avenue, rented single bedrooms to several unrelated individuals, including Mr. Ro-
mero. Id. at 106 (Stevens, J., concurring). A renter could place a padlock on the outside of the
door to lock the bedroom. Id. Furthermore, behind the house, individuals rented trailers. Id.
27. Id. at 95 (majority opinion).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 95-96.
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members, they brought in a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team to
secure the house and premises.3 0 The SWAT team formulated a tactical plan
for the search, which stated the petitioners should release any handcuffed
occupants who were unrelated to the search.3'
On February 3, 1998, the petitioners, the SWAT team, and other offic-
ers executed the search warrant at 7 a.m. 32 At this time, Iris Mena, respon-
dent, was in her bedroom sleeping.33 Wearing black vests with the word
"POLICE" written on them and with their badges visible, SWAT team
members entered Ms. Mena's bedroom and handcuffed her at gunpoint.34 In
addition, the SWAT team found and handcuffed three other individuals on
the property.35 The SWAT team then took Ms. Mena and the others to a
converted garage.36 While the search continued, the four detainees were free
to move around the converted garage, but they were in handcuffs the entire
time.37 One or two officers watched the detainees for the duration of the
search.3" Officers also filled out field identification cards on the detainees,
which determine whether they may release a detainee from handcuffs. 39 At
some point during the detention, Ms. Mena, with her arms handcuffed be-
hind her back, asked the officers to remove the handcuffs because they were
uncomfortable, but the officers denied her request.4" In addition, officers
were diverted at times from the search of the house to supervise the detai-
30. Id. at 96.
31. Mena, 544 U.S. at 110-11 (Stevens, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 96 (majority opinion). The petitioners were in charge of executing the search
and supervising the detention of the occupants of the house. Brief for the Respondent at 6,
Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (No. 03-1423). In total, there were at least eighteen officers at the scene.
Id. at 3. While officers were conducting the search at the Mena residence, other officers were
executing a search at the house of Mr. Romero's mother, and officers found Mr. Romero at
that location. Mena, 544 U.S. at 107 (Stevens, J., concurring). Although Officer Muehler
knew Mr. Romero had been found, officers continued to detain Ms. Mena. See Transcript of
Oral Argument at 33-34, Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (No. 03-1423).
33. Mena, 544 U.S. at 96. At the time of this incident, Ms. Mena was eighteen-years old.
Brief for the Respondent, supra note 32, at 3. In addition, Ms. Mena was five feet, two inches
in height. Mena, 544 U.S. at 105 (Stevens, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 96 (majority opinion).
35. Id. Officers found these three individuals in the trailers that were located in the
backyard. Id. at 107 (Stevens, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 96 (majority opinion). While it was raining, officers forced Ms. Mena to walk
barefoot to the converted garage in her nightclothes. Id. at 107 (Stevens, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 96 (majority opinion). At trial, two witnesses for the defense testified that it
was not typical police procedure to keep non-suspect detainees in handcuffs after it has been
determined that they pose no threat to the safety of the officers. Brief for the Respondent,
supra note 32, at 9.
38. Mena, 544 U.S. at 96.
39. Id. at 110 (Stevens, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 109.
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nees, and at least one officer, who was not needed in the search, was sent
home.4
Furthermore, an officer asked for each detainee's name, date and place
of birth, and immigration status during the detention. 42 Ms. Mena answered
the questions.43 The officers had notified the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) of the search because illegal immigrants comprised much of
the West Side Locos gang.44 Therefore, an INS agent was present during the
execution of the search warrant and asked to see Ms. Mena's immigration
documents. 45 Ms. Mena also complied with this request.
46
The search of the house revealed a .22 caliber handgun, .22 caliber
ammunition, .25 caliber ammunition, baseball bats that had gang writing on
them, various other gang paraphernalia, and a small amount of marijuana.47
The officers did not find any guns, ammunition, gang paraphernalia, or nar-
cotics in Ms. Mena's bedroom.4 Ms. Mena's detention lasted for up to three
hours.49 However, there was evidence to suggest that the officers held Ms.
Mena after the execution of the search had been completed.50
Ms. Mena filed suit against the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 5'
claiming that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a detention that
was unreasonable in time and manner.5 2 Moreover, Ms. Mena claimed that
the warrant was overbroad, that the execution of the warrant was overbroad,
that the officers failed to "knock and announce," and that the officers unne-
cessarily destroyed property while executing the search warrant. 3 The dis-
trict court denied the petitioners' motion for summary judgment based on
their entitlement to qualified immunity.54 On appeal of that motion, the court
of appeals affirmed the district court on all grounds except on the claim that
41. Id. at 110.
42. Id. at 96 (majority opinion).
43. Id. at 110 (Stevens, J., concurring).
44. Mena, 544 U.S. at 96 (majority opinion).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 110 (Stevens, J., concurring); Brief for the Respondent, supra note 32, at 4-5.
47. Mena, 544 U.S. at 96. Mr. Romero's room yielded .25 caliber ammunition, a blow-
gun, and a baseball bat. Brief of Petitioners at 9, Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (No. 03-1423).
48. Mena, 544 U.S. at 107 (Stevens, J., concurring).
49. Id. During the ordeal, the officers never requested Ms. Mena's assistance in complet-
ing the search. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 32, at 5.
50. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 32, at 9; see also Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment, supra note 32, at 28-30.
51. This statute provides that if an individual acting under the color of law deprives
another of a constitutional right, then the individual will be liable for such injury. 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (2000).
52. Mena, 544 U.S. at 96.




the warrant was overbroad.5 The case went to trial, and a jury entered a
verdict in favor of Ms. Mena.5 6 Using a special verdict 57 form, the jury found
that the petitioners' conduct resulted in an unreasonable seizure of Ms. Me-
na because they used unreasonable force to effectuate the seizure and de-
tained her for an unreasonable amount of time.58 Since the petitioners vi-
olated Ms. Mena's Fourth Amendment rights, the jury awarded her a total of
$60,000.' 9
On appeal of the jury verdict, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, analyzing the denial of qualified immunity under a de
novo standard, affirmed the verdict on two grounds. 60 First, the court of ap-
peals held that it was objectively unreasonable to handcuff Ms. Mena during
the detention and to make her stay in the converted garage while the officers
conducted the search. 6' The court opined that the officers should have re-
leased Ms. Mena once they determined that she was not an immediate
threat.62 Second, the court held that the questioning of Ms. Mena's immigra-
tion status independently violated her Fourth Amendment rights.63 The court
held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because Ms.
Mena's Fourth Amendment rights were established at the time of the ques-




57. With a special verdict, the jury determines issues regarding factual findings, and
based on those determinations, the judge decides the legal ramifications of the jury's find-
ings. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1593 (8th ed. 2004).
58. Mena, 544 U.S. at 97.






64. Mena, 544 U.S. at 97.
65. Id. The petitioners did not challenge the court of appeals' ruling on the qualified
immunity issue in the petition for certiorari, so the Court did not address that issue. Id. at 105




After briefly tracing the history of the Fourth Amendment,66 this sec-
tion examines the evolution of the standard that governs a limited seizure of
a person.67 Next, this section discusses the jurisprudence of excessive force
claims against law enforcement officials.6" Then, this section explores the
issue of whether police questioning constitutes a limited seizure of a per-
son.69 Finally, this section investigates how long a limited seizure of a per-
son may last.7"
A. The Beginnings of the Fourth Amendment
Prior to 1760, the navigation and trade acts passed by the English Par-
liament to restrict the American colonies from trading with areas outside of
the English Empire were rarely enforced. 7' Believing that the acts were un-
fair and knowing that they were loosely enforced, American colonists en-
gaged in extensive smuggling of goods. 72 However, starting in 1760, cus-
toms officers began using writs of assistance to enter buildings and search
for smuggled goods.73 The colonists showed intense anger toward the use of
these writs because it gave customs officials limitless discretion to search a
premises on a permanent basis. 74 This resentment over the writs persisted
until the Revolutionary War.75
In 1787, the Constitutional Convention drafted a constitution but omit-
ted a bill of rights.76 Those opposed to the ratification of the constitution
demanded incorporation of a bill of rights, including a provision regarding
searches.77 James Madison, assuming the role as sponsor of the bill of rights,
66. See infra Part III.A.
67. See infra Part II.B.
68. See infra Part III.C.
69. See infra Part III.D.
70. See infra Part III.E.
71. JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN
CONSTrrTIONAL INTERPRETATION 30 (1966).
72. Id.
73. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 1.1(a), at 7 (4th ed. 2004); LANDYNSKI, supra note 71, at 30.
74. LANDYNSKJ, supra note 71, at 31.
75. LAFAVE,supra note 73, § 1.1(a), at 7; LANDYNSKI,supra note 71, at 37.
76. LAFAVE, supra note 73, § 1.1(a), at 7; LANDYNSKI, supra note 71, at 39. The omis-
sion of a bill of rights caused profound criticism of the new constitution throughout the coun-
try. LAFAVE, supra note 73, § 1.1(a), at 7; LANDYNSKI, supra note 71, at 39.
77. LAFAVE, supra note 73, § 1.1(a), at 7. President Washington also lobbied for a bill of
rights. Id.; LANDYNsKI, supra note 71, at 41.
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drafted the first provision concerning searches.7" After Madison presented
his draft, the committee modified his version.79 Congress approved this
modified version of the Fourth Amendment,80 and the States ratified it as
part of the Bill of Rights in 1791.8
B. The Evolution of the Standard that Governs a Limited Seizure of a
Person
Traditionally, probable cause was the absolute standard that had to be
met in order to conduct an arrest or search, whether or not a warrant had
been issued.82 The United States Supreme Court defined probable cause as
facts that justify a person of reasonable caution to believe that another per-
son had committed or was committing a crime8s3 However, in Camara v.
Municipal Court,84 the Court redefined probable cause to a standard of rea-
sonableness when an administrative search is involved. 5 In that case, Mr.
78. LAFAVE, supra note 73, § 1.1(a), at 7; LANDYNSKI, supra note 71, at 41. Madison's
proposed version read as follows:
The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, their houses, their papers,
and their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affir-
mation, or not particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or
things to be seized.
LAFAVE, supra note 73, § 1. l(a), at 7; LANDYNSKI, supra note 71, at 41.
79. LAFAvE, supra note 73, § 1.1(a), at 7; LANDYNSKI, supra note 71, at 41. The com-
mittee's version read as follows: "The right of the people to be secured in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, shall not be violated by warrants issuing without probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and not particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized." LAFAVE, supra note 73, § 1.1(a), at 7; LANDYNSKI, supra
note 71, at 41. The committee revised this version by switching the word "secured" with
"secure" and adding the phrase "unreasonable searches and seizures," which was mistakenly
omitted. LAFAVE, supra note 73, § 1.1(a), at 7; LANDYNSKI, supra note 71, at 41. The com-
mittee voted down a proposed change by Representative Benson to use the phrase "no war-
rant shall issue," instead of "by warrants issuing." LAFAVE, supra note 73, § 1.1(a), at 7;
LANDYNSKI, supra note 71, at 41-42. However, since Representative Benson was the chair-
man of the committee, he reported his version of the text. LAFAVE, supra note 73, § 1.1(a), at
7; LANDYNSKI, supra note 71, at 42. The members of the House did not notice the change.
LAFAVE, supra note 73, § 1.1(a), at 8; LANDYNSKI, supra note 71, at 42.
80. LAFAVE, supra note 73, § 1. 1(a), at 7-8; LANDYNSKI, supra note 71, at 41-42.
81. LANDYNSKI, supra note 71, at 42.
82. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1979).
83. Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of
Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. RaV. 383, 392 (1988).
84. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Previously, the Court had held that housing inspections did not
implicate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 530. However, the Court in Camara overruled the
prior precedent and held that housing inspections were subject to Fourth Amendment scruti-
ny. Id. at 534.
85. Sundby, supra note 83, at 392-93.
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Camara refused housing inspectors entry into his residence several times
because they failed to present a search warrant. 86 The Court stated that, in
the context of an administrative search, the reasonableness standard should
be determined by balancing the interests of the government against the in-
terests of the private individual.8 7 The Court declared that the housing in-
spection was reasonable because such inspections had been accepted for a
long time, the inspections would probably be the only effective way to pro-
tect public health and safety, and the inspections were limited in nature.88
A year later, the Court applied the reasoning of Camara to stop-and-
frisk situations in Terry v. Ohio.89 In Terry, a veteran police officer in plain
clothes saw three individuals acting suspiciously and approached them.9 °
After identifying himself as a police officer, he grabbed Mr. Terry and pat-
ted down the outside of his clothing.9' The officer felt a revolver in Mr. Ter-
ry's overcoat pocket, which he eventually removed.9
In order to determine if the officer's stop-and-frisk violated the Fourth
Amendment, the Court stated that there must be "specific and articulable
facts" that, when combined with rational inferences, justify such an intru-
sion by the police officer.93 The Court elaborated that this standard requires
due weight to be given to the officer's specific, reasonable inferences from
the facts, while also considering the experience of the officer. 94 However,
the Court refused to give weight to any non-specific suspicions or mere
hunches by the officer.95 Courts now refer to this as the "reasonable suspi-
cion" standard.96
With this standard as a guiding principle, the Terry Court then pro-
ceeded to weigh the governmental interests against the individual's interests
86. Camara, 387 U.S. at 526-27.
87. Id. at 534-35.
88. Id. at 537.
89. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In a later opinion, the Court stated that Terry created the first
exception to the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement to seize persons. Dunaway
v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1979).
90, Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-6. The officer, a thirty-nine-year veteran of the police force,
observed two men walking separately back and forth in front of a store window, conferring
with each other after each walk-by. Id. Then, a third man approached the men, talked briefly,
and departed. Id. at 6. The two continued their ritual for several minutes before heading in the
same direction as the third man. Id. The officer proceeded to follow the two men and noticed
that they were speaking with the third man. Id.
91. Id. at 6-7.
92. Id. at 7. Also, the officer patted down the other two men, which led to the discovery
of a revolver on the second man, Mr. Chilton, but the officer did not find any weapons on the
third man, Mr. Katz. Id.
93. Id. at 21.
94. Id. at 27.
95. Id.
96. 1 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 15.4, at 779 (3d ed. 2000).
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in this situation.97 Generally, the government has an interest in crime pre-
vention and detection.98 More specifically, in this instance, the government
had a great interest in protecting the police officer and others from a poten-
tially armed and dangerous individual.99 Although the Court acknowledged
that a temporary seizure and limited search for weapons over outer clothing
was a great, though brief, invasion,' ° the Court held that such a search and
seizure nevertheless was reasonable in light of the government's interest in
protecting the police officer and others when the officer has a reasonable
suspicion that the individual may be armed and dangerous.'0 '
In the following years, the Court faced many opportunities to extend
the reasonable suspicion test to circumstances that went beyond the stop-
and-frisk situation that occurred in Terry.0 2 In Adams v. Williams,'13 the
Court held that a police officer had reasonable suspicion to frisk a suspect
sitting in his vehicle because a reliable informant"° reported that the suspect
possessed a gun and narcotics, the suspect was in a high-crime area, and the
suspect did not comply with the officer's request to exit the vehicle.'0 5 In
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,"6 a border patrol case, the Court held that
a police officer who has a reasonable suspicion that a vehicle is carrying
illegal aliens may briefly stop the vehicle to determine whether such activity
is occurring. 7 In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 10 8 the Court held that if during a
valid traffic stop there are circumstances that reasonably lead an officer to
97. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-24.
98. Id. at 22.
99. Id. at 23-24.
100. Id. at 24-25.
101. Id. at 27.
102. See HALL, supra note 96, § 15.4, at 779-81.
103. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
104. The Court reasoned that the informant was reliable because the police officer knew
the informant, the informant had provided information to the officer in the past, the informant
gave the information personally to the officer, the information provided was immediately
verifiable, and state law allowed for immediate arrest of a person making a false complaint.
Id. at 146-47.
105. Id. at 146-48.
106. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
107. Id. at 881. The Court identified several factors for determining if there is reasonable
suspicion to warrant a border patrol stop, including the characteristics of the area in which the
officer encounters the vehicle, any suspicious behavior of the driver, and the appearance of
the vehicle and its occupants. Id. at 884-85. However, the Court ruled that there was not
reasonable suspicion to conduct a border patrol stop in this case because the officer relied
only on the fact that the occupants of the car were of Mexican descent. Id at 885-86.
108. 434 U.S. 106 (1997).
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believe the stopped driver possesses a firearm,' 0 9 the officer has reasonable
suspicion to frisk the driver." 0
With this increased application of the reasonable suspicion test, the
Court identified the outer boundaries of the Terry decision in Dunaway v.
New York."' In that case, the police, after gaining information that would
not suffice for probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant, picked up Mr.
Dunaway, took him into custody, and questioned him about a murder."
2
After establishing that this was a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment,' 13 the Court refused to extend Terry to this type of seizure be-
cause it was nearly the equivalent of a traditional arrest.' 14 The Court also
stated that if it permitted the reasonable suspicion standard to cover this
intrusive seizure, then Terry would threaten to swallow the Fourth Amend-
ment's general rule that seizures are reasonable only if based on probable
cause.' Thus, in Dunaway, the Court confined the Terry doctrine to limited
intrusions of individual privacy." 6
Two years after Dunaway, the Court again applied Terry in Michigan
v. Summers."7 Detroit police detained Mr. Summers as he exited a house for
which the officers had a warrant to search for narcotics.." 8 During the search,
the police found narcotics and learned that Mr. Summers owned the
house.' The police then arrested and searched Mr. Summers, finding he-
roin.12 0 Since the State did not dispute that a seizure of a person had oc-
curred,' 2' the Court had to determine whether the reasonable suspicion stan-
dard or the probable cause standard governed the detention of Mr. Summers
109. Here, the officer noticed a large bulge under the driver's jacket and feared that the
driver was concealing a weapon, so the officer frisked the driver. Id. at 107. The frisk resulted
in the officer finding a loaded revolver. Id.
110. Id. at 111-12. The Court also addressed the issue of whether the officer violated the
Fourth Amendment by requesting that the driver step out of the vehicle, even before the
officer noticed the bulge in the driver's jacket, during the valid traffic stop. Id. at 109-11. The
Court reasoned that having the driver step out of the vehicle decreased the risk that the officer
would be assaulted by the driver, that conducting the inquiry on the shoulder of the road
would reduce the risk of any harm caused by moving traffic, and that having the driver stand
outside the vehicle was merely a de minimis intrusion. Id. at 110-11. Thus, the Court held
that such a request was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 111.






117. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
118. Id. at 693.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 696.
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during the search of his house, 122 The Court stated that whether Terry ap-
plied in this circumstance depended on the "character of the official intru-
sion and its justifications.'
123
In assessing the character of the intrusion, the Court focused on three
main factors. 14 First, the police had secured a valid search warrant on Mr.
Summers's house to search for contraband. 125 The Court reasoned that de-
tention of a resident during a search is far less intrusive than the search it-
self.126 Second, it was unlikely that the police would prolong the seizure
since the search would probably reveal the information that they were seek-
ing. 127 Finally, the public stigma of the detention was minimal since it oc-
curred within the resident's house.
128
The Court also evaluated the three justifications for the detention.
29
First, the Court noted that police officers have legitimate interests in pre-
venting flight and reducing the risk of potential danger to the officers. 30 The
Court reasoned that a person is more likely to flee if incriminating evidence
is discovered, and the probability for violence is greater when police are
searching for narcotics.'' Second, officers may be able to complete the
search in a more effective and efficient manner if the occupant is present.
132
Third, the Court stated the "nature of the articulable and individualized sus-
picion" that was the basis for the police detention of the occupant should
also be considered. 33 Noting again that the intrusion was minimal,'34 the
Court concluded that Mr. Summers's detention was justified because there
was a valid warrant to search for narcotics, which automatically grants the
officer reasonable suspicion to believe an occupant of the house is engaged
in criminal activity. 1
35
122. Id. at 701.
123. Summers, 452 U.S. at 701.
124. Id. at 701-02.
125. Id. at 701.
126. Id. The dissent proclaimed that this argument by the Court was circular because the
issue of the detention's severity arises only because the detention was not based upon a valid
warrant or probable cause. Id. at 712 n.4 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 701 (majority opinion).
128. Id. at702.
129. Summers, 452 U.S. at 702.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 703. In dissent, Justice Stewart argued that the first two justifications were
"nothing more than the ordinary police interest[s] in discovering evidence of crime and ap-
prehending wrongdoers." Id. at 708-09 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 703 (majority opinion).
134. Id.
135. Summers, 452 U.S. at 703-04.
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The Court went on to hold that "a warrant to search for contraband
founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to
detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted."'
' 36
Thus, the Court created a bright-line rule that eliminated any ad hoc deter-
minations by the police as to whether a detention is necessary under the cir-
cumstances.'37 This type of limited seizure of a person is now referred to as
a Summers detention.
138
To summarize, a limited seizure of a person is governed by the reason-
able suspicion standard, which is a lower standard than probable cause.
139
The Court has applied the reasonable suspicion standard to many different
situations.' However, the Court has strictly confined the application of the
reasonable suspicion standard to limited seizures of persons.' 4' In situations
in which the seizure of a person is nearly equivalent to an arrest, the Court
has required the fulfillment of the probable cause standard.
142
C. The Jurisprudence of Excessive Force Claims Under the Fourth
Amendment
Before 1985, courts analyzed excessive force claims under a four-
factor, substantive due process test. 143 However, in Tennessee v. Garner,
144
the Court ruled that excessive force claims against police officers should be
136. Id. at 705. In a footnote, the Court stated, "[A]lithough special circumstances, or
possibly a prolonged detention, might lead to a different conclusion in an unusual case, we
are persuaded that this routine detention of residents of a house while it is being searched for
contraband pursuant to a valid warrant is not such a case." Id. at 705 n.2 1. However, as the
dissent pointed out, the Court did not fashion any guidelines to determine what constitutes
"special circumstances" or when a detention becomes "prolonged." Id. at 712 n.5 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
137. Id. at 705 n. 19 (majority opinion).
138. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005).
139. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
140. See Penn. v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1997); Mich. v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. 873 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972).
141. Dunaway v. N.Y., 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
142. Id.
143. Kathryn R. Urbonya, Public School Officials' Use of Physical Force as a Fourth
Amendment Seizure: Protecting Students from the Constitutional Chasm Between the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 23 (2000); Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 392-93 (1989). The four-factor test was announced by Judge Friendly in Johnson
v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973). Id. at 392. The four factors were the following: (1) the
need for the use of force; (2) the correlation between that need and the amount of force that
was actually used; (3) the extent of the injury caused by the force; and (4) whether the force
was applied in good faith to maintain and restore discipline or whether the force was applied
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Id. at 390-93.
144. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
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determined under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness test,'45 thus im-
plicitly rejecting the use of the substantive due process test for such
claims.' 46 In Garner, a police officer shot and killed a fleeing male suspect,
even though the officer saw that he had no weapon and was relatively sure
he was unarmed.'47 The Court restated the principle that the nature and qual-
ity of the intrusion on the individual shall be balanced against any govern-
mental interest that might justify such an intrusion.'48 The Court elaborated
that the extent of the intrusion depends on when the police make the seizure
and how the police conduct the seizure.'49
On one hand, the Court looked at three interests of the individual: (1)
the individual's life; (2) the avoidance of using deadly force against the in-
dividual; (3) and the formal adjudication of guilt and punishment. 5° On the
other hand, the government had an interest in providing effective law en-
forcement. 5 ' In the Court's view, the government's one interest did not
outweigh the three interests of the individual. 5 2 Thus, the Court held that a
police officer may not use deadly force to seize an unarmed, nondangerous
fleeing suspect.
5 3
Four years later, the Court faced another excessive force issue in Gra-
ham v. Connor.'54 However, this time the Court explicitly held that all
145. Id. at 7.
146. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. The Court in Garner focused exclusively on the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness test in its analysis, never mentioning the substantive due
process test. Garner, 471 U.S. at 7-22.
147. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3-4. The officer had authority from a state statute and a depart-
ment policy to use deadly force in this situation. Id. at 4.
148. Jd. at 8.
149. Id.
150. Id. at9.
151. Id. The State argued that using deadly force to stop a fleeing suspect would reduce
overall violence because such a suspect, knowing that deadly force may be used, will be more
likely to submit peacefully. Id. In addition, the State argued that deadly force or threat of
deadly force would allow police to be more effective in making arrests, which was a condi-
tion precedent of law enforcement. Id. at 9-10.
152. Id. at 10.
153. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. The Court, however, declared that deadly force may be used
to prevent a suspect's escape when the officer has probable cause to deem that the suspect
poses a danger of serious, physical harm to the officer or others. Jd. The Court also men-
tioned that the officer should give a warning to the fleeing suspect, if feasible. Id. at 11-12.
154. 490 U.S. 386 (1989). Mr. Graham, a diabetic, entered a convenience store to pur-
chase orange juice to stop an insulin reaction but left because it was crowded. Id at 388-89.
Noticing Mr. Graham walk suspiciously out of the store to a friend's vehicle, an officer made
an investigatory stop. Id. at 389. During the stop, Mr. Graham got out of the car, ran around
the vehicle twice, sat down, and then passed out for a short amount of time. Id After tightly
cuffing Mr. Graham, officers placed him face down on his friend's car hood, and an officer
shoved Mr. Graham's face into the hood once. Id. During the incident, Mr. Graham sustained
a broken foot. lacerations on his wrists, a bruised forehead, an injured shoulder, and loud
ringing in his right ear. Id. at 390.
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claims of excessive force, deadly and non-deadly, used during an arrest,
investigatory stop, or any other seizure of a person shall be determined un-
der the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment, not the substan-
tive due process test. 5 5 The Court did recognize, however, that police offic-
ers have a right to use some physical force or threat of physical force when
conducting an arrest or investigatory stop.'56 The Court declared that, under
the Fourth Amendment, whether an officer's use of force is objectively rea-
sonable depends upon the viewpoint of a reasonable officer at the scene, not
upon any underlying intent or motive of the officer.'57
To sum up, deadly and non-deadly excessive force claims against law
enforcement officials are analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the
Fourth Amendment.' To make a determination under this standard, a court
must balance the government interests that justify the intrusion against the
interests of the individual to avoid such an intrusion.159 And the party with
the greater interests shall prevail. 6
D. The Use of Police Questioning to Constitute a Limited Seizure of a
Person
Prior to 1984, the Supreme Court had not ruled squarely on whether
mere police questioning of an individual constituted a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.'6' In INS v. Delgado,'62 immigration agents entered
worksites pursuant to a warrant to determine if illegal aliens were presently
working by asking the employees questions about their citizenship. 63 The
Court ruled that mere police questioning did not amount to a seizure under
the Fourth Amendment unless the police were so intimidating that a "rea-
155. Id. at 395.
156. Id. at 396.
157. Id. at 396-97.
158. Garner, 471 U.S. at 7-8; Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
159. Garner, 471 U.S. at 7-8; Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
160. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 9-10.
161. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984). The Court reasoned that the decision
from Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion), implied that police question-
ing of a person's identity or a request for identification did not constitute a seizure. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 211-12. The process of questioning the employees' immigration status is
called a "factory survey." Id at 212. During a factory survey, several agents will be located
near the building's exits, and the other agents will disperse throughout the factory to question
the majority of employees about their immigration status. Id. In this case, if an employee
answered inadequately or admitted to being an alien, the agents asked the employee for im-
migration papers. Id. at 212-13. While the agents conducted the search, the employees con-
tinued working and walking freely around the factory. Id. at 213.
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sonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not
responded."'" 4
Seven years later, in Florida v. Bostick,'65 the Court addressed the issue
of whether the Delgado rule applied to police questioning that occurred on a
bus.'66 The Florida Supreme Court had adopted a per se rule that it was un-
constitutional for police officers to question individuals on a bus.'67 The
Court reversed the state supreme court and stated that it was incorrect for
adopting a per se rule.1 68 In reaching its decision, the Court reasoned that the
circumstances in this case were the same as those in Delgado.169 Although
the Court remanded the case to the state court to determine if a seizure oc-
curred, 7 ' the Court reaffirmed the rule that a court shall consider all of the
circumstances to determine if the police conduct during questioning com-
municated to a reasonable person that the person was not at liberty to end
the encounter.'71 The Court declared that this rule applied whether the ques-
tioning took place on a street, in an airport lobby, or on a bus.'72
In sum, a limited seizure of a person is unlikely to occur when law en-
forcement officials merely question a person. 73 However, courts must look
at the totality of the circumstances to see whether a reasonable person en-
during the questioning would have felt free to leave and end the encoun-
ter.174 If a reasonable person would not have felt free to do so, a limited sei-
zure of the person has occurred, and the Fourth Amendment is implicated.
175
Moreover, since lower courts must consider all of the circumstances, the
Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the use of per se rules in this area of
constitutional law. 1
76
164. Id. at 216.
165. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
166. Id. at431.
167. Id. at 433. The state supreme court reasoned that a seizure of a person occurred here
since a reasonable person, as a passenger on a bus, would not have felt free to get off the bus
to evade the police questioning. Id. at 432-33.
168. Id. at 440.
169. Id. at 436.
170. Id. at437.
171. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439.
172. Id. at439-40.
173. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984).
174. Id.; Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439.
175. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216; Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439.
176. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 440.
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E. The Duration of a Limited Seizure of a Person
A limited seizure of a person inevitably requires some kind of time re-
striction. 77 In United States v. Place,178 after being notified by other law
enforcement officers of Mr. Place's suspicious behavior and after noticing it
for themselves, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents at La
Guardia Airport seized Mr. Place's luggage and subjected the luggage to a
narcotics-detection dog sniff test. 179 The dog detected narcotics in the small-
er of the two bags but did not detect any in the larger bag. 80 From the time
of the seizure to the sniff test, approximately ninety minutes had passed.' 8
The Court faced the issue of whether the ninety-minute detention of the
luggage, based on the reasonable suspicion that the bag contained narcotics,
violated the Fourth Amendment.8 The Court reasoned that a seizure of a
traveler's personal luggage restrains the person because the person must stay
with the luggage or find alternative means for its return.'83 Thus, when law
enforcement agents seized luggage from Mr. Place, a limited seizure of the
person also occurred.'84 The Court stated that, without the presence of prob-
able cause, the ninety-minute detention alone made the limited seizure of
Mr. Place unreasonable.'85 The Court explained that the brevity of a seizure
is an important factor when determining whether a limited seizure of a per-
son is justified on mere reasonable suspicion. 8 6 In addition, whether the
177. HUBBART, supra note 2, at 181.
178. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
179. Id. at 698-99. Mr. Place departed from Miami International Airport to arrive at La
Guardia Airport in New York. Id. at 698. Law enforcement officials, suspicious of Mr.
Place's conduct, questioned him before his flight left Miami and then contacted the DEA
officials at La Guardia to inform them of the encounter. Id. The DEA agents were waiting for
Mr. Place when he arrived in New York. Id.
180. Id. at699.
181. Id. Since the seizure occurred on a late Friday afternoon, the agents held the luggage
until the next Monday morning in order to obtain a search warrant for the smaller bag. Id.
The execution of the search warrant revealed that the smaller bag contained 1125 grams of
cocaine. Id.
182. Id. at 697-98.
183. Id. at 708. The Court made this decision even though it acknowledged that a traveler
is still technically free when law enforcement officials seize the luggage, that the law en-
forcement officials subject the traveler to an environment that is less intimidating than a
custodial confinement, and that the traveler is not exposed to the public stigma of a seizure of
his or her person. Id.
184. Place, 462 U.S. at 708-09.




police acted diligently during their investigation is relevant in determining if
the detention was reasonable.187
The Court noted that the DEA agents in New York could have mini-
mized this intrusion because they knew about Mr. Place's time of arrival and
had more-than-adequate time to prepare for the investigation.'88 The Court,
although refusing to set an outside time limitation for a limited seizure of a
person, stated that it had never before allowed a ninety-minute limited sei-
zure of a person, and it declined to approve the length of the detention in
this case.'89
Two years later, the Court again addressed the issue of the duration of a
limited seizure of a person in United States v. Sharpe.'90 The Court, as it did
in Place, expressly refused to adopt any specific time limit for a permissible
limited seizure of a person because such a per se rule would contradict its
jurisprudence in this area of the law."'9 The Court also elaborated on Place's
rule by stating that a court should not engage in unrealistic second-guessing
of whether the police acted diligently in the investigation. 192 The Court de-
clared that the question should be "whether the police acted unreasonably in
failing to recognize or to pursue" a less intrusive altemative. 93
Recently, the Court alluded to another possible dimension in determin-
ing whether a limited seizure of a person lasts for an unreasonable amount
of time.'94 In Illinois v. Caballes,'95 the Court addressed the issue of whether
a law enforcement official needs reasonable suspicion to conduct a narcot-
ics-detection dog sniff on a vehicle during a legal traffic stop. 96 In dictum,
the Court reasoned that a limited seizure of a person, based on the issuance
of a warning ticket during a valid traffic stop, could become unlawful if the
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 709-10.
190. 470 U.S. 675 (1985). In this case, Mr. Savage, who was driving a pickup truck,
made elusive moves to escape from a DEA officer. Id. at 678. However, Mr. Savage even-
tually pulled over, and the DEA officer found marijuana in the truck during the stop. Id. at
678-79. The stop lasted approximately twenty minutes. Id. at 683.
191. Id. at 685-86.
192. Id. at 686. The Court declared that any delay in the investigatory stop was due to the
evasive actions of Mr. Savage, not the actions of the DEA officers. Id. at 687-88.
193. Id. at 687.
194. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005).
195. 543 U.S. 405.
196. Id. at 407. In this case, a state trooper stopped Mr. Caballes for speeding. Id. at 406.
While the trooper wrote a warning ticket, another trooper walked a narcotics-detection dog




police prolonged the seizure for longer than was required to accomplish the
task. 117
To conclude, the Court does not endorse a strict time limit in determin-
ing whether the duration of the seizure of the person was brief enough to
consider the seizure limited. 98 Instead, the Court has fashioned factors in
order to make such a determination.' 99 The two main factors are the brevity
of the seizure and the diligence of the law enforcement officials. 200 Howev-
er, the Court has qualified the second main factor by stating that lower
courts are precluded from engaging in unrealistic second-guessing of the
law enforcement officers' diligence. 2°' Furthermore, another possible con-
sideration in this determination is whether the law enforcement officials
prolonged the seizure of the person for longer than was necessary to com-
plete their task. 2
IV. REASONING
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, began its
analysis with Michigan v. Summers,2 3 which held that officers may detain
occupants of a house when executing a valid search warrant for contra-
band. 2' Based on that precedent, the majority declared that the detention of
Ms. Mena was acceptable because she was an occupant of a house that the
officers had a valid warrant to search for deadly weapons and gang para-
phernalia.20 5
The majority then discussed the issue of whether handcuffing Ms. Me-
na constituted excessive force.206 The majority stated that utilization of rea-
sonable force during a detention was inherent in the holding of Summers.2 °7
The majority repeated the reasoning from Summers that there is a decreased
197. Id. at 407. In reaching this conclusion, the Court accepted the state court's findings
that the utilization of the dog sniff did not prolong the duration of the traffic stop. Id. at 408.
The Court went on to hold that if a dog sniff only reveals the location of contraband during a
lawful traffic stop, then no Fourth Amendment violation has occurred. Id. at 410.
198. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1983); Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686.
199. Place, 462 U.S. at 709.
200. Id.
201. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686-87.
202. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407.
203. 452 U.S. 692 (1981); see supra Part III.B.
204. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005).
205. Id. The majority noted that it would view the facts in favor of the jury verdict, but it
would not defer to the jury's conclusion that the facts violated Ms. Mena's Fourth Amend-
ment rights. Id. at 98 n. 1.
206. See id. at 98-100.
207. Id. at 98-99.
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risk of harm to officers and others when the officers have unquestioned con-
trol of the situation. 20 8 Moreover, the majority cited Graham v. Conner2 9 to
support its conclusion that law enforcement officials may use reasonable
force or threat of force to effectuate the detention. 2" Thus, the majority con-
cluded that the handcuffing of Ms. Mena for the purposes of the detention
was reasonable since such force was merely a marginal intrusion that did not
outweigh the government interests.2
However, the majority acknowledged that the use of handcuffs was an
additional, independent intrusion on Ms. Mena.212 Since Ms. Mena suffered
two intrusions, one for the detention and the other for the handcuffing, the
majority admitted that her detention was a greater intrusion than the intru-
sion that occurred in Summers.2"3 Nevertheless, the majority held that the
Fourth Amendment permitted the use of handcuffs on Ms. Mena. 21 '4 The
majority reasoned that when a warrant authorizes a search for weapons and
evidence of gang membership in a house, the government's interests are at
their maximum in justifying detaining occupants and utilizing handcuffs on
those occupants. 215 The majority elaborated that, in hazardous situations, the
use of handcuffs to detain occupants reduces the risk to officers. 216 The ma-
jority added that when detaining multiple occupants, the use of handcuffs is
even more justified." 7
Ms. Mena argued that even though the handcuffing might have been
reasonable initially, the detention violated her Fourth Amendment rights
because the amount of time that she spent in handcuffs was unreasonable.218
Referring back to Graham, the majority acknowledged that the length of the
detention could affect the balancing of the interests between the government
and individual.219 Yet, in response to Ms. Mena's argument, the majority
replied that the safety interests of the government still outweighed the two-
to-three-hour detention that Ms. Mena endured in handcuffs. 220 Again, the
majority stressed the fact that two officers had the task of removing and
208. Id. at 99 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 703); see supra Part III.B.
209. 490 U.S. 386 (1989); see supra Part III.C.
210. See Mena, 544 U.S. at 99 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396); see supra Part III.C.
211. Mena, 544U.S. at99.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 102.
215. Id. at 100.
216. Id.






detaining four occupants from a house that was being lawfully searched for
deadly weapons and gang paraphernalia.22'
Next, the majority considered whether the questioning of Ms. Mena
about her immigration status during her detention violated the Fourth
Amendment. 222 The court of appeals had answered that question in the af-
firmative. 23 The majority, however, rejected the lower court's reasoning
that the questioning was a separate Fourth Amendment seizure. 2 4 Thus, the
majority declared that the officer and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) agent did not need independent reasonable suspicion to ques-
tion Ms. Mena about her immigration status. 225 The majority reiterated the
general rule that "mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure.' 226
Furthermore, the lower court held that the questioning did not prolong
Ms. Mena's seizure.227 Accepting this finding, the majority recognized that
the questioning of Ms. Mena did not create an additional seizure. 228 The
majority then compared the situation presented in Illinois v. Caballes229 with
Ms. Mena's situation. 30 Since Ms. Mena's detention was initially valid and
the questioning of her immigration status did not prolong her detention, the
officer and INS agent did not need a reasonable suspicion to justify the
questioning.23'
After summarizing its holding that the petitioners' conduct was consti-
tutionally permissible, the majority dismissed Ms. Mena's claim that she
was detained for longer than the duration of the search since the court of
appeals did not address that argument.232 Having found for the petitioners
regarding the alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment, the majority va-
cated the Ninth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case.233
B. Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinion
Although Justice Kennedy joined in the opinion and judgment of the
majority because the record failed to show that the use of handcuffs was
221. Id.
222. See id. at 100-02.
223. Mena, 544 U.S. at 100.
224. Id. at 101.
225. Id. The majority explained that the officers were also not required to have reasonable
suspicion to ask Ms. Mena for her name, date of birth, or place of birth. Id.
226. Id. (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)); see supra Part III.D.
227. Mena, 544 U.S. at 101.
228. Id.
229. 543 U.S. 405 (2005); see supra Part III.E.
230. Mena, 544 U.S. at 101.
231. Id.




excessive, he wrote a concurrence to voice his concerns about police hand-
cuffing, stressing that such conduct should not become prevalent or unrea-
sonably prolonged during searches. 34
As in the majority opinion,235 Justice Kennedy stated that since hand-
cuffing was force, the objectively reasonable standard governed its utiliza-
tion. 36 Furthermore, Justice Kennedy noted that both the government and
the individual have great interests in whether law enforcement officials use
force during a lawful detention. 37 On the one hand, the government has a
great interest in protecting officers from harm and in conducting an efficient
search.238 On the other hand, an occupant of a house being searched, who is
not a criminal suspect, has a great concern that excessive force not be used
during the detention.239
Justice Kennedy then considered when the use of handcuffs might be-
come unreasonable. 24" After stating that the reasonableness determination
includes considerations of the "expected and actual duration of the search,"
Justice Kennedy declared that officers should have procedures to alleviate
any pain or severe discomfort that the handcuffs create when the search lasts
for an extended amount of time.214 ' Furthermore, if during the search it be-
comes "readily apparent to any objectively reasonable officer that removing
the handcuffs would not compromise the officers' safety or risk interference
or substantial delay in the execution of the search," the officer should re-
move the handcuffs from the detainee.242 Justice Kennedy opined that the
two-to-three-hour search was close to, and might have exceeded, the time
requirement for assessing whether the use of handcuffs on Ms. Mena was
still necessary. 3
Even though Justice Kennedy had reservations in those regards, he rea-
soned that the circumstances still permitted the officers to handcuff Ms.
Mena for the duration of the search.2 " Justice Kennedy focused on the fact
that only two officers were supervising the four detainees, while sixteen
other officers were executing a comprehensive search of the house.2 45 This
234. Id. at 102-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
235. See supra Part IV.A.
236. Mena, 544 U.S. at 103 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see supra Part III.C.
237. See Mena, 544 U.S. at 102-03 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
238. Id. at 102.
239. Id. at 102-03.
240. See id. at 103.
241. Id. Even if the initial handcuffing was objectively reasonable, Justice Kennedy
stressed that law enforcement officials should adjust the handcuffs if the duration of the de-
tention becomes prolonged. Id.
242. Id.





fact persuaded Justice Kennedy that the use of handcuffs was reasonable,
even though Ms. Mena posed no threat to the officers, and it was not typical
police procedure to handcuff occupants of a house during a search. 246 Thus,
Justice Kennedy declared that when detainees outnumber the supervising
officers and when diverting other officers from an extensive search would
be the only way to resolve the problem, the use of handcuffs for the duration
of the search may be justified.247 However, Justice Kennedy again added that
such authority was "subject to adjustments or temporary release under su-
pervision to avoid pain or excessive physical discomfort." '248
C. Justice Stevens's Opinion Concurring in the Judgment
Justice Stevens opined that the court of appeals committed two errors
when affirming the jury verdict that the officers violated Ms. Mena's Fourth
Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure. 249 First, like the
majority,"' Justice Stevens reasoned that the lower court erred in holding
that the questioning of Ms. Mena about her immigration status was a sepa-
rate, independent Fourth Amendment violation.25 1 Second, Justice Stevens
stated that the court of appeals did not give the proper level of deference to
the jury's reasonable factual findings, since the court of appeals apparently
ruled as a matter of law that Ms. Mena should have had the handcuffs re-
moved at an earlier time.
252
Next, Justice Stevens critiqued the majority's reasoning on the issue of
whether handcuffing Ms. Mena constituted excessive force.253 Justice Ste-
vens reasoned that the majority opinion misapplied the objectively reasona-
ble test.254 Under the circumstances of this case and given "the presumption
that a reviewing court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of sup-
porting the verdict,, 255 Justice Stevens concluded that a jury could have ap-
propriately found that the officers used unreasonable force in handcuffing
Ms. Mena, who posed no threat to the officers, for up to three hours. 256 Jus-
246. Id. Justice Kennedy assumed that those facts were true because the Court had to
view all factual assertions in favor of the jury verdict. Id.; see supra note 202 and accompa-
nying text.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 103-04.
249. Mena, 544 U.S. at 105 (Stevens, J., concurring).
250. See supra Part IV.A.
251. Mena, 544 U.S. at 105 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens also noted that
neither party raised this issue to the court of appeals. Id. at 105 n.3.
252. Id. at 105.
253. See id.
254. Id.
255. Id.; see supra note 202 and accompanying text.
256. Mena, 544 U.S. at 105 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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tice Stevens stressed that Summers does not give officers executing a valid
search warrant the authority to handcuff non-threatening, detained occupants
of a house for the duration of the search.257
After noting that the initial handcuffing of Ms. Mena was justified un-
der the circumstances, Justice Stevens explained why those initial justifica-
tions did not validate the prolonged use of handcuffs.258 Justice Stevens de-
clared that the totality of the circumstances of the detention should be consi-
dered, including how the handcuffs were utilized and whether Ms. Mena
was kept in handcuffs after the search was completed.259
In this case, Ms. Mena's arms were handcuffed behind her back for two
to three hours, and she testified at trial that the handcuffs were uncomforta-
ble.2 60 Ms. Mena asked the officers to remove them, but the officers denied
her request. 26' Yet, Justice Stevens noted, even if the officers had removed
the handcuffs, it would have been nearly impossible for Ms. Mena to flee
because the officers guarded her constantly during the detention.262 Further-
more, the search revealed no contraband in Ms. Mena's room, and there was
no evidence suggesting that she had ever been affiliated with a gang.263 She
also had answered all the questions the officer and INS agent asked, she was
unarmed, and she was small in stature.264 Thus, Justice Stevens stated that
there was no evidence that Ms. Mena was a threat to the officers or others.265
In his opinion, based on the totality of the circumstances, a jury could have
reasonably found that the extended or prolonged amount of time that Ms.
Mena endured in the handcuffs was unreasonable.266
Next, Justice Stevens declared that the officers lacked proper justifica-
tions to handcuff Ms. Mena for the duration of the search.267 First, Justice
Stevens concluded that the deficiency of officers to guard the four detainees
was probably not an actual problem since at least one officer who super-
vised the four was sent home after offering to help in the search.268 Although
a court should not ordinarily question the allocation of officers during a
search, Justice Stevens stated that a jury could have reasonably found that a
sufficient number of officers were available in this case to detain the occu-
257. Id. at 105-06.
258. See id. at 108-11.
259. Id. at 109.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Mena, 544 U.S. at 109-10 (Stevens, J., concurring).




267. Id. at 110-11.
268. Mena, 544 U.S. at 110 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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pants without the use of handcuffs. 26 9 To support his argument further, Jus-
tice Stevens noted that the officers completed field identification cards27
that allowed them to determine whether to remove the handcuffs from a
detainee. 7' He also noted that the officers supervising Ms. Mena had pre-
viously been diverted from the ongoing search.2 72 Thus, Justice Stevens
found it hard to believe that, if Ms. Mena was not handcuffed, additional
officers would have been needed to supervise Ms. Mena.273
Second, Justice Stevens concluded that the jury might have been un-
convinced by the officers' testimony regarding their actual belief that they
were in danger because they knew that other officers had already found the
suspect, Mr. Romero, at his mother's house.274 The jury, in Justice Stevens's
opinion, also might have been skeptical of the officers' testimony regarding
their policy to keep detainees in handcuffs during a search of a residence
because the SWAT team's tactical plan for this search called for releasing
the detainees from handcuffs.275
Although Justice Stevens did concede that police safety was always a
factor that weighed heavily in determining whether the use of force is rea-
sonable, he noted that if this factor alone was sufficient, then it would allow
police during a valid Summers detention to handcuff every detainee for the
entire length of the search.276 Justice Stevens declared that precedent did not
support such a bright-line rule and that courts should instead make a case-
by-case determination of whether the use of such force is unreasonable.277
Justice Stevens concluded by indicating that on remand he would instruct
the court of appeals to decide whether the evidence presented in the record
was adequate to support the jury's verdict in favor of Ms. Mena, taking into
consideration the possibility that the officers detained her after the search
was completed. 78
269. Id.
270. The use of field identification cards, as Justice Stevens pointed out, is a standard




274. Mena, 544 U.S. at 111 (Stevens, J., concurring).
275. Id. at 110-11. The tactical plan stated that an occupant of the house would initially
be handcuffed, detained, and frisked, but after that procedure, either petitioner would release
the occupant. Id.






The importance of the United State Supreme Court's decision in Mueh-
ler v. Mena 19 is threefold. First, the majority created another bright-line
rule 8 ° that may have both positive and negative effects.28' Second, the ma-
jority's incomplete analysis may lead lower courts to make inconsistent de-
cisions in the future.28 2 Lastly, the Court's decision has left many questions
unanswered.283
A. The Double-Edged Sword of a Bright-Line Rule
In Mena, the majority fashioned a bright-line rule that-allows the police
to handcuff and question detained occupants of a house that is being
searched pursuant to a valid search warrant. 284 The formation of bright-line
rules in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence generally benefits two primary
groups.28 5 First, law enforcement officials benefit from bright-line rules be-
cause such rules can be easily communicated in straightforward terms.286
Moreover, bright-line rules eliminate the need for law enforcement officials
to apply sophisticated and technical rules in the heat of the moment.87
Second, the judiciary benefits from bright-line rules.288 Judges at the trial
level can apply these bright-line rules to cases in a simple manner. 289 As a
result, appellate judges will review fewer issues regarding seizures of per-
sons.2 90 Accordingly, these two primary groups should benefit from the
bright-line rule formulated by the majority in Mena.
279. 544 U.S. 93 (2005).
280. A bright-line rule is a rule that tends to resolve legal questions and ambiguities in a
straightforward manner, but may do so at the cost of equity. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 57, at 205.
281. See infra V.A.
282. See infra Part V.B.
283. See infra Part V.C.
284. See supra Part V.A.
285. See Daniel T. Gillespie, Bright-Line Rules: Development of the Law of Search and
Seizure During Traffic Stops, 31 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 3 (1999). From personal experience, law
school students also benefit from bright-line rules.
286. Id. The municipalities that employ police officers will also benefit indirectly from
the formulation of Fourth Amendment bright-line rules. See David Parkhurst, Court Cases
Victories for Municipalities, NATION'S CITIES WEEKLY, Mar. 28, 2005.
287. Gillespie, supra note 285, at 12 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 22
n.3 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).





* However, the continued formulation of bright-line rules in Fourth
Amendment cases may be harmful.29' First, the formation of a bright-line
rule in one case has the potential to easily develop into a bright-line rule in
another case.292 This is because bright-line rules allow courts to glaze over
important issues. To illustrate, the Court in Michigan v. Summers23 created
a bright-line rule stating that law enforcement officials with a valid search
warrant may detain the occupants of a house that is being searched for con-
traband.294 With this bright-line rule already in place, it was easier for the
majority in Mena to simply extend the Summers decision and create another
bright-line rule295 than to completely analyze Ms. Mena's situation. 29 6 In the
future, the Court may use the Mena decision to springboard the creation of
more bright-line rules without realizing that it is failing to address important
issues.
Second, if the Court continues to create bright-line rules in search and
seizure cases, law enforcement officials may find it nearly impossible to
manage such a plethora of rules,297 which would negate any benefit that law
enforcement officials gain from bright-line rules. For example, if law en-
forcement officials have to know 250 technical bright-line rules when deal-
ing with searches and seizures, some law enforcement officials may find it
difficult to remember the correct rule and apply it properly when needed. If
such difficulties arise, law enforcement officials may violate the suspect's
Fourth Amendment rights, possibly allowing the suspect to avoid conviction
for the actual offense. Clearly, the Mena decision adds another bright-line
rule for law enforcement officials to attempt to comprehend while out in the
field of duty. Furthermore, with the Court's ability to easily create bright-
line rules, as previously mentioned, the addition of bright-line rules may
become perpetual, thus constantly exposing the inability of law enforcement
officials to manage such an overabundance of rules.
B. The Majority's Incomplete Analysis
The majority's analysis in Mena was incomplete because of four pri-
mary deficiencies, which may cause inconsistent decisions in lower courts
291. Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Pirr. L.
REv. 227, 231 (1984).
292. Id. Professor Alschuler also suggests that bright-line rules are often difficult for
courts to apply. Id. Consequently, Judge Gillespie and Professor Alschuler would disagree
about the advantages of bright-line rules. See Gillespie, supra note 285, at 3.
293. 452 U.S. 692 (1981); see supra Part III.B.
294. See supra Part III.B.
295. See supra Part IV.A.
296. See infra Part V.B.
297. Alschuler, supra note 291, at 231.
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on issues regarding seizures of persons. Moreover, those inconsistent deci-
sions may result in one court convicting a defendant because that court fol-
lows precedent holding that the seizure was proper, while another court
would not convict the same defendant because that court follows different
precedent. Such immense injustice could have been prevented if the majori-
ty had fully analyzed Ms. Mena's situation.
The first deficiency is the fact that even though the detention in Mena
was more intrusive than the detention in Summers,298 the majority had fewer
justifications for the detention in Mena.99 As earlier noted, a Summers de-
tention is justified by the following interests: (1) preventing flight of the
occupant if incriminating evidence is found; (2) reducing the risk of harm to
the officers conducting the search; and (3) completing the search in a more
orderly fashion. 00 However, once officers failed to find incriminating evi-
dence in Ms. Mena's room, the justification to prevent her from fleeing was
eliminated.30' In addition, the handcuffs were not needed to prevent Ms.
Mena from fleeing because police officers constantly guarded her for the
duration of the search.3 2 There was also no evidence to suggest that Ms.
Mena was a threat to the officers.30 3 Thus, the justification of reducing the
risk of harm to officers was eradicated. Furthermore, during Ms. Mena's
detention, officers did not ask for her assistance in completing the search,
negating the justification of completing the search more efficiently. ° Since
the majority's analysis is inconsistent with the Summers opinion in these
regards, lower courts may be forced to determine how many justifications, if
any, are needed to justify an even more intrusive detention. Thus, lower
courts may have varying opinions on this issue, depending on whether they
follow the rationale of Summers or Mena.
The second deficiency involves the majority's analysis of the question-
ing issue. The majority declared that the questioning of Ms. Mena did not
constitute an independent Fourth Amendment seizure of a person.305 In its
analysis, the majority reiterated the general rule that mere police questioning
298. The detention in Mena was more intrusive because Ms. Mena was detained in hand-
cuffs. See supra Part IV.A.
299. See supra Part V.A.
300. See supra Part III.B. In Mena, the majority also declared that Ms. Mena's detention
was justified because the detainees outnumbered the guarding officers. See supra Part IV.A.
However, Justice Stevens illustrated that such a justification in this case lacked adequate
grounds. See supra Part IV.C.
301. See supra Part II.
302. See supra Part II.
303. See supra Part IV.C.
304. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
305. See supra Part 1V.A. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens agreed with the




does not constitute a seizure of a person. °6 However, the majority did not
consider the exception to this general rule, which states that police question-
ing does constitute a seizure of a person if a reasonable person in the same
situation would not feel free to walk away from the encounter or would not
feel free to decline to answer the officer's questions.37 Certainly, a reasona-
ble person in Ms. Mena's situation would not feel free to walk away from
this encounter because Ms. Mena was handcuffed and constantly guarded by
officers. However, the more difficult question is whether a reasonable per-
son in Ms. Mena's situation would not feel free to respond to the questions
asked by the officer and INS agent. By failing to address the exception to
the general rule, the majority implicitly created a per se rule that a reasona-
ble person in Ms. Mena's situation would feel free to decline answering the
questions and would feel free to walk away from the encounter.
However, the majority's implicit per se rule contradicts the Court's
prior rulings.3 °8 The Court has explicitly rejected a per se rule declaring that
questioning a suspect automatically constitutes a limited seizure of the sus-
pect.30 9 In the future, lower courts may be forced to decide whether to follow
Mena's implicit per se rule or whether to adhere to the jurisprudence prior to
Mena, which may result in conflicting decisions.
The third deficiency of the majority's analysis is the fact that it failed
to distinguish New York v. Dunaway' from Ms. Mena's situation.31' In Du-
naway, as noted above, police officers seized Mr. Dunaway without proba-
ble cause, took him down to the police station, and questioned him about a
murder.3t 2 The Court held that the officers violated Mr. Dunaway's Fourth
Amendment rights because his seizure was nearly the same as an arrest,
which must be supported by probable cause, rather than reasonable suspi-
cion.3"3 Moreover, the Court declared that if it ruled that the reasonable sus-
picion standard covered this type of seizure, then the reasonable suspicion
standard would threaten to swallow the general rule that seizures are only
reasonable if based on probable cause.314 In Ms. Mena's situation, police
306. See supra Part IV.A.
307. See supra Part III.D.
308. See supra Part III.D.
309. See supra Part III.D.
310. 442 U.S. 200 (1979); see supra Part III.B.
311. See supra Part IV.A. Ms. Mena even made this argument in her brief to the Court,
but to no avail. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 32, at 21-22. Furthermore, like the ma-
jority, Justice Stevens's concurring opinion failed to make this distinction. See supra Part
1V.C. Thus, his opinion was also lacking in this aspect.
312. See supra Part III.B.
313. See supra Part IlI.B.
314. See supra Part 1II.B.
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officers likewise seized her without probable cause,315 took her to a nearby
converted garage, and questioned her about her immigration status.316 De-
spite the similarities between the two situations, the majority in Mena ig-
nored the Dunaway opinion and declared that Ms. Mena's seizure was con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment.3 7
Nevertheless, some may assert that these two situations are sufficiently
distinct to justify the inconsistent holdings. The main distinction is the fact
that Mr. Dunaway was taken to the police station for questioning, while Ms.
Mena was taken to a nearby converted garage to be questioned. However, if
this distinction between Dunaway and Mena makes the two cases distin-
guishable, then the result would be illogical. For example, armed with the
knowledge that it is improper to seize and take an individual to the police
station for questioning based on less than probable cause, police officers
will merely seize and question that person on the premises or near the pre-
mises in order to comply with the Fourth Amendment. Yet, it seems absurd
that physical proximity to one's familiar surroundings can be the basis to
subvert that individual's Fourth Amendment rights.
Because the distinction between Dunaway and Mena should not be al-
lowed to make the cases distinguishable, the majority should have declared
that Ms. Mena's seizure violated the Fourth Amendment because her seizure
was nearly equivalent to an arrest. However, because the majority failed to
address this important issue, lower courts may be left to face it, which might
lead to inconsistent decisions. If lower courts follow Mena in this regard,
those courts will be disregarding the Court's strict declaration in Dunaway
that seizures of this nature are reasonable only if probable cause has been
met.
Finally, the majority failed to fully consider the issue of whether the
duration of Ms. Mena's detention was reasonable. In prior cases dealing
with a limited seizure of a person, the Court, although not setting a time
limit, estabished that the brevity of the seizure and the diligence of the po-
lice are important factors in determining whether the duration of a seizure,
based on reasonable suspicion, was reasonable.31 8 Yet, the majority failed to
acknowledge these factors in Mena. Clearly, the seizure was not brief be-
cause the officers detained Ms. Mena for up to three hours. 319 Furthermore,
315. As noted above, a Summers detention is based on the reasonable suspicion standard,
not on the probable cause standard. See supra Part III.B.
316. See supra Part lI.
317. See supra Part IV.A.
318. See supra Part 1II.E.
319. See supra Part II. The Court has held that a seizure of a person lasting ninety mi-
nutes was unreasonable, thus violating the person's Fourth Amendment rights. See supra Part
III.E. Yet, Ms. Mena was held for approximately twice that long, and the majority held that
her seizure complied with the Fourth Amendment. See supra Part IV.A.
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the majority did not question whether the police acted diligently in complet-
ing the search of the house. The majority was also unwilling to allow the
lower court on remand to look into whether the officers detained Ms. Mena
for longer than the search lasted,32 even though there was evidence to sup-
port that claim.321 Instead, relying on the recent Cabelles case, the majority
considered only whether the questioning of Ms. Mena prolonged her sei-
zure. 322 Yet, it seems odd that the majority would completely ignore those
established factors in order to follow dictum from the Caballes case.323 Be-
cause the majority overlooked these factors in its analysis and relied solely
on Caballes, lower courts may be left to determine whether such factors are
still relevant in determining whether the duration of a seizure of a person
was reasonable. Conflicting opinions may result depending on whether low-
er courts follow the recent trend of Caballes and Mena.
C. The Questions Left Unanswered
With the issues regarding bright-line rules and the majority's incom-
plete analysis resulting in a rule of law conflicting with prior Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, one may wonder what the actual underlying
reasons supporting the majority's decision were? Perhaps, the majority
reached its decision in light of the fact that our country has been greatly
concerned about terrorism since September 11. The majority may have been
making its decision based on expectations that situations similar to Ms. Me-
na's may happen to terrorists harbored within our borders. With that possi-
bility in mind, the majority may have ruled the way it did in order to bring
terrorists to justice more easily in the future.
In support of such reasoning, the majority in Mena may have recog-
nized that gangs and terrorist groups share a vital characteristic: both contain
individuals with a wealth of knowledge about the past and future criminal
activity of other group members. Allowing law enforcement officials to
handcuff and question possible terrorists, who are validly detained under
Summers, may flush out information that would bring those who committed
a terrorist attack to justice or prevent a terrorist attack from occurring. The
majority may have felt that if it created a rule stating it is improper to hand-
cuff and question a person in a situation like Ms. Mena's, then it might be a
more difficult task to fashion a contrary rule in a future case involving ter-
rorists. Thus, this may have been the underlying reason why the majority
ruled in the manner that it did.
320. See supra Part [V.A.
321. See supra Part II.
322. See supra Part V.A.
323. See supra Part III.E.
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However, the majority may have made its decision merely to keep a
short leash on the liberal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has been
critical of the Court.324 Yet, the terrorism rationale and the "short leash"
theory are merely guesses at what may have been underlying the majority's
decision. Nevertheless, such uncertainty does not change the fact that the
Mena decision is the law of the land for the time being.
Since Mena is currently the law, maybe the more important question is
what the true impact of this decision will be? This inquiry spawns several
other questions. For instance, how often will the situation in Mena actually
occur in day-to-day police activity?325 If the situation does not occur that
often, then the majority's holding may affect only a relatively small percen-
tage of individuals, thus reducing the potential for lower courts to make con-
tradictory rulings regarding the issues that the majority failed to adequately
address.326 However, the creation of this rule may jolt law enforcement offi-
cials to use this power more often, which may potentially lead to a great
number of conflicting lower court opinions.
Another question that arises is whether the Court will adopt the majori-
ty's analysis in future cases regarding seizures of persons.3 27 Alternatively,
will the Court instead adopt Justice Stevens's rationale?328 Will the Court
and law enforcement officials take heed of Justice Kennedy's warning that
handcuffing during a Summers detention should not become customary or
prolonged?32 9 With the majority's analysis contradicting prior Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence,33 ° the Court may have good grounds in future
cases to qualify the Mena decision, strictly interpret it, pigeonhole it as an
"anomaly," or even overrule it. On the other hand, the Court may look upon
the majority's analysis with great favor in the future.
Furthermore, how much of our Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable seizures will the Court surrender in order to protect law
324. Jeff Chorney, For 9th Circuit: Lots of Scrutiny and 9-0 Reversals by High Court,
RECORDER, July 1, 2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1120122313700 (last visited
Mar. 30, 2006).
325. It has been suggested that the situation in Mena may not occur as frequently as the
dog-sniffing encounter that took place in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005). See Ha-
rold J. Krent, The Continuity Principle, Administrative Constraint, and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 53, 88 (2005).
326. See supra Part V.B.
327. See supra Part W.A. This question and the following questions are raised because,
in essence, the majority had only five votes because Justice Stevens's concurrence amounted
to a dissent. See G. Paul McCormick, Supreme Court 2004-2005 Review, 29 CHAMPION 16,
17 (2005).
328. See supra Part IV.C.
329. See supra Part IV.B.
330. See supra Part V.B.
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enforcement officials?33' Protecting the men and women who enforce the
law is, has always been, and should always be a great concern for the judi-
cial system. But, such protection should never trump an individual's consti-
tutional right to be free from an unreasonable seizure. If the Court continues
to favor protecting law enforcement officials at the expense of our Fourth
Amendment rights, then the Fourth Amendment will be reduced to mere
rubbish.
To conclude, the majority's analysis, which created a bright-line rule
that contradicts the Court's prior decisions, leaves one to ponder what the
underlying reason for the majority's decision was and what the future im-
pact of this decision will be. Unfortunately, for now, those questions are left
unanswered. Hopefully with time and debate, the answers will be unleashed.
Ryan J. Caststeel
331. Although not addressing this question directly, Justice Stevens expressed concerns
that the police-safety interest alone should not override an individual's Fourth Amendment
rights. See supra Part 1V.C.
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